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FERTILITY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CHINA
Arthur P. Wolf and Theo Engelen
Fertility and Fertility Control in Pre-
Revolutionary China The argument of Malthus’ First Es-
say on Population is largely developed on the basis of a comparison
between three countries—Britain, the United States, and China.
England is presented as an example of an “old state” in which pop-
ulation growth has been considerable in the past but is slow at
present. The reason is that “a foresight of the difªculties attending
the rearing of a family acts as a preventative check, and the actual
distress of some of the lower classes, by which they are disabled
from giving the proper food and attention to their children, acts as
a positive check.” This observation holds for all old states because
they lack the resources necessary to support further growth.1
Malthus offers the United States as an example of a new state
in a “healthy country . . . with plenty of food and room” and insti-
tutions that made good land affordable and agriculture a good in-
vestment. The result was that, as in new colonies generally, the
population grew “with astonishing rapidity.” Malthus underlines
the point by asking why an equal number of people did not “pro-
duce an equal increase in the same time in Great Britain.” His an-
swer is, “The great and obvious cause . . . is the want of food and
room, or in other words, misery.”2
China was known to Malthus as “one of the most fertile, best
cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the
world,” but Smith characterized it as a country in which “the pov-
erty of the lowest ranks of people . . . far surpasses that of the most
beggarly nations in Europe.” Quesnay summed up the prevailing
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1 Thomas Robert Malthus, Population: The First Essay (Ann Arbor, 1959; orig. pub. Lon-
don, 1798), 22–24.
2 Ibid., 36–39.
view: “In spite of . . . the abundance that reigns, there are few
countries that have so much poverty among the humbler classes.
However great the empire may be, it is too crowded for the mul-
titude that inhabit it.”3
Malthus therefore viewed China as the third point of a theo-
retical triangle, belonging to a class of countries with periods
“when population increased permanently, without an increase in
the means of subsistence.” In such countries, “population appears
to have been forced, that is, the people have been habituated by
degrees to live almost upon the smallest possible quantity of food.”
China answered this description because “if the accounts we have
of it are to be trusted, the lower class of people are in the habit of
living almost upon the smallest quantity of food and are glad to get
any putrid offals that European laborers would rather starve than
eat.” A country in this condition “must necessarily be subject to
famines.”4
Although Malthus never doubted his views of Britain and the
United States, he was never entirely happy with his conclusions
regarding China. What worried him most was the report that de-
spite every acre of tillable land having long been under cultivation,
marriage was early and nearly universal. In his ªrst mention of
China, he called for “inqueries [sic] into the manner and habits of
the lower classes and the encouragements of early marriage.”
“Perhaps,” he wondered, “the fact of the universality of early mar-
riage may not be sufªciently ascertained.” He assumed that if mar-
riage was in fact early and universal, fertility must have been high.
He therefore thought it was of “the utmost importance” to ascer-
tain “in what manner the checks to a further population operate;
what are the vices, and what are the distresses that prevent an in-
crease of numbers beyond the ability of the country to support.”5
It is important to note that Malthus knew little or nothing
about most of the conditions that affect fertility. Most im-
portantly, he knew nothing about lactational amenorrhea. If Chi-
nese women married earlier and in greater numbers than British
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1946), II, 141–142.
4 Malthus, Population, 45–46.
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women, he could only conclude that their fertility was propor-
tionally higher, guaranteed by “the passion between the sexes.”
But why, then, did the Chinese marry in such great proportions
and at the earliest possible age? Many people were already living
on “the smallest possible quantity of food.” Why, despite the mis-
ery that this must inevitably have entailed, did even the poorest
among them marry at the ªrst opportunity?
Until recently, most scholars agreed that developments since
Malthus’ time had largely resolved his doubts while conªrming his
general view of China. Surveys conducted in the 1930s and archi-
val studies of genealogies indicated that despite early and universal
marriage, Chinese fertility was not as high as Malthus appears to
have imagined, largely because of late weaning, poor nutrition,
and female infanticide. It was, however, high enough to produce a
population that could appropriately be described as “forced.”
All of the evidence pointed to high infant and childhood mortal-
ity, low adult life expectancy, widespread poverty, and frequent
famines—what we call “the received wisdom.” It is represented
most effectively in Ping-ti Ho’s Studies on the Population of China,
1368–1953.6
Lee and Wang challenge this view in their inºuential book,
One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Real-
ities, 1700–2000. They agree that marriage was early and universal
in China but otherwise reject all of the Malthusian view of China.
They argue that China should not be conceived of as a third type
of society distinct from both Britain and the United States. In their
view, Britain and China were both old states in which population
was constrained by preventive rather than positive checks. They
differed only in how they managed fertility—the British by con-
trolling marriage and the Chinese by controlling marital fertility.
Lee and Wang sum up their argument in Malthus’ own language:
“Whereas European couples practiced moral restraint [that is, they
did not marry if they did not have the means to support a family]
but little marital restraint, Chinese couples practiced no moral re-
straint but considerable marital restraint.”7
A large proportion of Lee and Wang’s text is devoted to dem-
onstrating that marital fertility was lower in China than it was in
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Britain and other European states. Although their observation that
Chinese women bore fewer children per year of marriage than
European women is not controversial, they exaggerate the magni-
tude of the difference. Their further contention that Chinese fer-
tility was generally lower than Europe’s because Chinese couples
deliberately limited the size of their families cannot withstand
scrutiny. The Chinese practiced little, if any, effective birth con-
trol. China’s marital fertility may well have been lower than Eu-
rope’s, but its total fertility was far higher.
Lee and Wang’s primary thesis concerning the relative impor-
tance of positive and preventive checks rests on the claim that
marital fertility control in China was the equivalent of marriage
control in Britain. To prove it, they must demonstrate that Chi-
nese fertility was no higher than British fertility, but they fail to do
so; they do not even try. They report total fertility rates for China,
but they never compare them with British or European total fer-
tility rates. Although they repeatedly contrast Chinese and Euro-
pean marital rates, they never risk comparing their total rates.
They claim that “Chinese fertility overall was not much higher
than European fertility, while marital fertility was signiªcantly
lower,” but offer no data to support the ªrst half of their claim.8
What was the average total fertility rate in China prior to the
1949 revolution, and how does it compare with the average Brit-
ish rate? The one pre-1949 rate that Lee and Wang report is the
ªgure calculated by Barclay et al. on the basis of John Lossing
Buck’s famous farm surveys—5.5. It is an estimate based on data
collected by male students who, as males, were unable to inter-
view their female subjects and had to depend on information pro-
vided by husbands or other male relatives. When Wolf revisited
seven of the communities included in the study and interviewed
women old enough to have been included in the Buck study, he
obtained a rate of 5.78. The fact that older women had trouble re-
membering children who died as infants suggests that the true rate
could be close to 6.0.9
The best reason for suspecting that the ªgure from the Buck
survey underestimates Chinese fertility is another survey con-
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ducted from 1930 to 1934 by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen.
Whereas the Buck survey was a student effort directed by an agri-
cultural economist, the Chiao, Thompson, and Chen study was a
professional effort directed by one of the leading demographers of
the time. Unlike Buck and his student collaborators, the research-
ers did not rely on interviews. They set up their own registration
system in rural Kiangsu, and recorded births and deaths as they oc-
curred for four years. The result is the most authoritative demo-
graphic data collected on the Chinese mainlaind prior to the fertil-
ity survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in
1982. The fertility data from this study are reproduced in original
form in Table 1. The age-speciªc rates for the four years yield total
fertility rates of 6.86, 6.24, 5.58, and 6.85. The decline in the sec-
ond and third years of the study is interesting as evidence of the
factors effecting Chinese fertility. Chiao, Thompson, and Chen
attribute it to a depression that lowered the marriage rate and a
malaria epidemic that raised the miscarriage rate.10
One of the numerous scholarly failings of Lee and Wang’s ef-
fort is the failure to discuss the Chiao, Thompson, and Chen
study. The work is not even listed as a reference. Equally egre-
gious is their failure to refer to Tuan’s 1958 study of fertility in ru-
ral Taiwan during the Japanese occupation—one of the seven
studies that form the basis of Henry’s deªnition of natural fertility
and a seemingly indispensable primary source for any book de-
voted to Chinese demography. Tuan’s data are reproduced in Ta-
ble 2 in the form of period rates for the years 1903 to 1953. Only
the rate for the years 1903 to 1907 falls below 6.0, and there is rea-
son to believe that this ªgure underestimates the true rate. Con-
cerned that some children who died as infants may not have been
registered, Tuan interviewed 463 of the women included in the
study. He found that 9.5 percent of births by women aged sixty or
older at the time of the study did not appear in the registers.
Among women aged forty-ªve to sixty the ªgure was only 1.5
percent.11
Although Tuan’s work suggests that under-registration oc-
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curred before 1915, the household registers compiled by the Japa-
nese colonial government are the best basis for estimating the fer-
tility of any large Chinese population. Household heads were
required to report all births and deaths to the police within ten
days, and the police visited every household at least once a year to
make sure that these reports were accurate. The records from
twenty-two of the Taiwanese communities subjected to this re-
gime are represented in the fertility rates reported in Table 3. The
residents of the localities included in the table were all Hokkien-
or Hakka-speaking Han Chinese. Localities with a substantial
non-Han population were excluded.12
The ªrst point to note about Table 3 is that, with one slight
exception, the rates for 1906 to 1915 are lower than the rates for
the later periods, undoubtedly because of the under-registration
documented by Tuan. All of these rates should be 5 to 10 percent
higher than shown. The second point to note is that the rates for
1936 to 1945 are all lower than the rates for 1926 to 1935—almost
certainly a result of the many kinds of disruption occasioned by
World War II. The third point is that the rates for urban Taiwan
are substantially lower than those for peri-urban and rural Taiwan,
and the rates for peri-urban Taiwan somewhat lower than those
for rural Taiwan. Wolf and Gates reason that urban and peri-urban
women were less likely to marry than rural women. During the
Japanese occupation, nearly one-fourth of the women raised in
Taipei City failed to marry by age ªfty.13
Table 3 is a set of ªgures that makes two points: (1) that in ru-
ral Taiwan, total fertility averaged approximately 6.0—a little
higher than the rates calculated on the basis of the Buck survey but
not as high as those documented by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen
in Kiangsu; (2) that contrary to Lee and Wang’s primary thesis,
fertility in Taiwan was conditioned by entry into marriage, not
by deliberate control within marriage. Only in Taipei City,
where a large proportion of women failed to marry, did rates fall
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12 For a detailed account of the registration system, see Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, Mar-
riage and Adoption in China, 1845–1945 (Stanford, 1980), 16–33. Working with a team of an-
thropologists and historians at the Academic Sinica, Wolf and Engelen entered into computer
format the data from a number of widely scattered communities originally collected under the
Japanese colonial government.
13 Wolf and Hill Gates, “Marriage in Taipei City: Reasons for Rethinking Chinese De-
mography,” International Journal of Asian Studies, II (2005), Figure 1, 119.
below 5.0. It took a European-like marriage pattern to produce
European-like fertility rates.
Although the evidence from Taiwan is the most reliable evi-
dence available, should it be asked to give testimony in a case try-
ing claims about China as a whole? Taiwan was under Japanese
occupation when the evidence was recorded, and it was a lawless
frontier not long before the Japanese arrived. Yet, in its favor, Tai-
wan was settled by farmers from southern Fukien and northern
Kwangtung who transplanted all of the institutions of their native
places. The manner in which these institutions differed from those
typical of other provinces does not appear to have resulted in dis-
tinctive demographic characteristics. The fertility rates reported in
Table 3 are not exceptional. They fall approximately half way be-
tween the rates estimated on the basis of Buck’s nation-wide sur-
vey and the rates reported by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen for a
locality close to the center of the most populated region of the
country.
The evidence cited to this point all refers to the years 1900 to
1949. With the exception of the genealogy of the Ch’ing imperial
family and the household registers of Han bannermen in Manchu-
ria, the only evidence available for earlier years comes from gene-
alogies compiled by the corporate kinship groups that anthropolo-
gists call “lineages.” This evidence is invaluable because it is the
only evidence, but it has serious limitations. Its ºaws can be over-
come sufªciently to extract fertility rates but only with the help of
assumptions about the nature of vital events in the distant past, the
most important of which concern the sex ratio at birth and infant
and childhood mortality. Lineage genealogists did not record fe-
male births and recorded male births only if the boy survived to an
age speciªed by lineage rules, usually between ªfteen and twenty
years.14
The great majority of the fertility rates published to date is the
work of Liu and Telford. Liu analyzed twenty-two genealogies
from six provinces in South China; Telford analyzed all the gene-
alogies extant from a county in Anhui province. The rates pub-
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lished by Liu range from 4.47 to 6.27, averaging 5.71. Those pub-
lished by Telford range from 6.78 to 9.56, averaging 8.21. The
large difference between the two authors’ ªgures is almost entirely
a result of their treatment of the way lineage genealogists recorded
births. Liu based her rates on a simple count of the births recorded,
whereas Telford adjusted his rates to take account of infant and
childhood mortality. He assumes an infant morality rate of 250 and
a childhood and adolescent rate of 100. When Liu’s rates are ad-
justed in the same way, they suggest a fertility rate of approxi-
mately 7.9 for the years 1450 to 1900. This rate would be substan-
tially higher given the assumption that infant mortality was as high
in these years as it was among the children of the women included
in Buck’s farm surveys. Barclay et al. estimated their infant mortal-
ity rate as 300 and their childhood/adolescent age rate at more
than 200.15
The rates that Liu and Telford estimate on the basis of the lin-
eage genealogies are all marital fertility rates. To obtain total fertil-
ity rates requires the assumption that Chinese marriage rates were
as high in the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties as they were in the Re-
publican period. The differences between the total and marital
rates reported by the studies cited above can then be used to esti-
mate total fertility in the years covered by the genealogies. These
differences are 0.68 births in the case of the rates estimated from
the Buck surveys; 1.03 births in the case of the rates reported by
Chiao, Thompson, and Chen; and an average of 1.43 births in the
case of the rates calculated on the basis of the Taiwan household
registers. Hence, the total fertility rate in the three centuries cov-
ered by the genealogies must have been at least as high as it was in
the early decades of the twentieth century.16
Based on these calculations, the average total fertility rate in
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620.
16 Barclay at al., “Reassessment,” 614; Chiao, Thompson, and Chen, Experiment, 45; Wolf,
“Fertility,” Tables 6 and 7, 454–455.
Late Imperial China was about 6.0—a ªgure that makes obvious
Liu and Wang’s reasons for avoiding direct comparisons of Chi-
nese and European total fertility rates. The comparison completely
refutes their claim of a preventive check in China as effective as
the one that Malthus identiªed in Europe. Wrigley et al. estimated
total fertility rates for England during the years 1541 to 1871 that
vary from 3.75 to 4.50. The average estimate for the period is only
4.35. Total fertility was higher elsewhere in Europe but nowhere
as high as in China. Livi Bacci listed 4.27, 4.27, and 4.49 for Swe-
den in 1800, 1850, and 1870; 5.07, 4.91, and 4.95 for Finland in
1800, 1850, and 1870; 4.60 and 5.23 for the Netherlands in 1850
and 1870; 3.38 and 3.42 for France in 1850 and 1870; and 4.88 for
Italy in 1870.17
The fact that China’s total fertility was high by European
standards does not necessarily mean that Chinese couples did not
take steps to limit their number of children. Conceivably, were it
not for deliberate fertility control, Chinese fertility would have
been as high as Malthus feared. Lee and and Wang’s claim that
“Chinese couples practiced no moral restraint but considerable
marital restraint” needs to be addressed fully.
Lee and Wang introduce their book with the statement,
“Chinese married women had a TMFR [total marital fertility rate]
of 6 or less.” “This low marital fertility was,” in their view, “one
of the most distinctive features of the Chinese demographic sys-
tem.” Their evidence is gathered in a table reproduced herein as
Table 4. The ªrst three ªgures, which are from Liu’s analyses of
lineage genealogies, are gross underestimates that take no account
of infant and childhood mortality. The ªgures in the fourth line of
the table refer to Telford’s study but misrepresent his results. The
range for the rates from the genealogies that he analyzed was from
7.24 to 9.19—not 5.4 to 8.2; the average ªgure was 8.2!18
The ªfth ªgure—the ªgure that pulls the average down to
“less than 6”—should not be included in the table. Its population,
which consists of Manchu noblemen who qualiªed for notice in
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inºated by 2.05 to give the total fertility rate (tfr). Massimo Livi Bacci (trans. Cynthia De
Nardi Ipsen and Carl Ipsen), The Population of Europe: A History (Cambridge, Mass., 2000),
136.
18 Lee and Wang, One Quarter of Humanity, 8; Telford, “Fertility and Population Growth,”
Table 3.1, 51.
the Ch’ing imperial genealogy, is not relevant to the argument.
Lee and Wang admit that these people are “atypical, since the
Qing imperial lineage was an elite population that depended solely
on the state for ªnancial support, was highly regulated, and was re-
quired to live in either Beijing or Shenyang.” They should have
added that, in addition to being a welfare elite, these people were
not Han Chinese.19
The sixth ªgure in the list raises again Malthus’ view of the
population in the United States as growing “with astonishing ra-
pidity” because it had “plenty of food and room.” Most scholars
now agree that this characteristic was typical of colonies. In the
years covered by Lee and Wang’s data, Liaoning was also a colony
with plentiful resources. Why do they ªnd that fertility there was
no higher than in China proper where resources were scarce? The
likely answer is that their data derive from records maintained by
the corrupt administration of a military colony. The colonists had
good reason not to register their sons and ample opportunity to
avoid doing so. As Isett wrote with respect to Lee and Wang’s data
from Daoyi,
Lee and Campbell’s TMFR ªgure for Daoyi [the ªgure used by
Lee and Wang] is by their own recognition an estimate based on
incomplete records. Poor ofªcial record keeping in Daoyi was en-
tirely in keeping with what we know of bureaucratic oversight in
Manchuria as a whole, where commoners lived illegally among serf
and banner communities without soliciting much ofªcial attention.
It is not surprising therefore that by their own estimates Lee and
FERTILITY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CHINA | 357
19 Lee and Wang, One Quarter of Humanity, 151.
Table 4 Total Marital Fertility in China by Period and Location
period location total marital fertility rate sample size
1296–1864 Hunan 6.0 2,670
1462–1864 Anhui 6.1 1,654
1517–1877 Jiangsu 5.8 1,784
1520–1661 Anhui 5.4 to 8.2 11,804
1700–1890 Beijing 5.3 3,178
1774–1873 Liaoning 6.3 3,000
1929–1932 22 provinces 6.2 50,000
source James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusiasn Mythology and
Chinese Realities (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), Table 6.1, 85.
Campbell believe fully one-half of all persons (one-third of males
and two-thirds of females) were never registered on the banner
rolls, a proportion that is in turn predicated on their belief that all of
those who survived to age sixteen sui (age ªfteen) were registered.
There were good reasons to keep children, especially males, off the
banner roll after they reached sixteen sui, however. As Lee and
Campbell note males in the banner system were liable for uncom-
pensated service to the state, including military service, which
heads of household would certainly wish to avoid.20
The source of the ªnal ªgure in the list is Barclay et al.’s
reanalysis of Buck’s 1930 to 1934 farm surveys. The ªgure ob-
tained herein from the table that Lee and Wang cite as their source
is 6.3, rather than 6.2, which does not matter much. What does
matter is that Lee and Wang fail to note that when Wolf revisited a
number of Buck’s ªeld sites, he obtained a rate of 7.03. What mat-
ters even more is that the table does not include the evidence pro-
vided by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen. The total marital fertility
rates for the four years of their study were 8.00, 7.23, 6.64, and
7.80. The average was 7.41.21
Many families in northern Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands
gave away their daughters as infants or small children, raising in
their stead wives for their sons. Wolf showed that because of early
association, couples married in this fashion had markedly lower
fertility than couples joined as young adults. When the effect of
these “minor marriages” is discounted, the data drawn from the
Taiwan household registers agrees with that reported by Chiao,
Thompson, and Chen. Allowing for 5 to 10 percent under-regis-
tration before 1915, the ªgures for the rural areas in Table 5 aver-
age close to 7.50 before 1925 and rise to well over 8.5 after 1925.
The ªgures for the urban and peri-urban areas are lower but still
average well above 6.0 in most years. Only in Taipei city before
1925 can the level of marital fertility that Lee and Wang take to be
normal for all of China be found.22
Lee and Wang’s representation of marital fertility in late tradi-
tional China is mistaken. The average rate was approximately 7.5
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20 Christopher Isett, State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644–1862 (Stanford,
2007), 189–190.
21 Wolf, “Fertility,” Table 10, 459; Chiao, Thompson, and Chen, Experiment, Table 32, 45.
22 See Wolf, Sexual Attraction and Childhood Association: A Chinese Brief for Edward
Westermarck (Stanford, 1995).
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rather than 6.0—still well below the typical European rate and far
below the rate reported for such exemplary populations as the
Hutterites. Thus, the numbers leave room for Lee and Wang’s
contention that Chinese couples practiced some form of deliberate
birth control. The question is whether the difference between
Chinese and the European levels was due to deliberate control or
to an involuntary condition. Lee and Wang admit that Chinese
mothers “practiced extended breastfeeding” and that this process
“contributed to long birth intervals and low fertility,” but they
nonetheless insist that their “low fertility” was the result of “their
ability and even willingness to regulate coital frequency” and their
use of “a wide variety of abortive techniques.”23
This claim is all the more surprising because Lee and Wang
recognize that Chinese fertility does not exhibit the characteristics
that most demographers, following Henry, take to be diagnostic of
deliberate fertility control. “Control,” according to Henry, “may
be said to exist when the behavior of the couple is bound to the
number of children already born and is modiªed when this num-
ber reaches the maximum which the couple does not wish to ex-
ceed.” Fertility that is not bound in this way Henry terms “natural
fertility.” It is high when people are young and declines slowly as
they age, producing a convex curve when fertility is plotted
against age. Deliberate fertility control is suspected only when
when fertility begins high and declines abruptly, producing a con-
cave age/fertility proªle.24
Although the fertility of natural-fertility populations is gener-
ally high, there is considerable variation. Consequently, fertility
that falls short of the highest rates recorded is not necessarily evi-
dence of control. The age/fertility relationship is crucial. In the
view of most demographers, deliberate fertility control always
produces a concave age/fertility proªle; a convex proªle is evi-
dence of lack of control. A relevant example is Barclay et al.’s in-
terpretation of the rates estimated on the basis of Buck’s Farm Sur-
vey. It characterizes Chinese marital fertility as “very low” but
rules out deliberate fertility control as an explanation because
“when control of fertility is common, the fertility of older married
women is especially low relative to the fertility of young women.
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Yet the age-speciªc marital fertility of older Chinese women is as
high, relative to that of the younger women, as in many popula-
tions judged by Henry to have uncontrolled or natural fertility.”25
Lee and Wang agree that Chinese fertility was “natural” in
Henry’s sense of the term, but they reject Barclay et al.’s conclu-
sion regarding birth control. They insist that despite presenting a
convex age/fertility proªle, Chinese fertility was a product of de-
liberate control achieved by means of “late starting, wide spacing,
and early stopping.” Chinese couples married young but deliber-
ately delayed their ªrst birth, deliberately avoided producing a
child in their later years, and deliberately spaced all of their births
as widely as possible. The result was a fertility proªle that looked
like natural fertility but was in fact the product of a life of deliber-
ate control.26
The reason why Henry’s distinction has served demographers
well is that control of the kind hypothesized by Liu and Wang is
both difªcult and risky—difªcult because of the extraordinary re-
straint required during youth and risky because of a couple’s in-
ability to count on their reproductive capacity surviving the many
hazards of aging, particularly in historical societies such as China
where famine was frequent, epidemics common, and social stabil-
ity uncertain. Given that Chinese couples all wanted at least two
sons, why would they adopt such a difªcult and risky strategy? If
they were as adept at birth control as Lee and Wang argue, why
not wait until they had the children that they wanted and then ini-
tiate a control program, as Taiwanese couples did during the fertil-
ity transition.
There is some evidence that Chinese women did not want as
many children as their husbands and may have made an effort in
their later years to avoid additional pregnancies. Otherwise, Chi-
nese couples bore as many children as possible given their circum-
stances. What Lee and Wang characterize as abortifacients were, in
most cases, emmenogogues, employed to enhance, rather than to
reduce, fertility. The fertility rates that they cite as evidence of de-
liberate control were, with the partial expectation of early stop-
ping, the result of involuntary conditions producing unintended
and largely unwanted consequences.27
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Although the interval between marriage and ªrst birth was
considerably longer in China than in Europe, and Chinese women
were younger at the birth of their last child than European women
were, the evidence does not support deliberate birth control. The
great majority of Chinese women married at, or shortly after,
menarche if not before. A long ªrst interval was therefore inevit-
able because “the ªrst several years following menarche are char-
acterized by a high fraction of anovulatory cycles” and “an ele-
vated risk of fetal loss should conception occur.” Because child
bearing was onerous, some Chinese women may have taken steps
to avoid bearing yet another child late in life, but this is only one
of many possible explanations of what Lee and Wang call “early
stopping.” Another is the possibility that because of poverty and a
high incidence of debilitating diseases, Chinese women aged faster
than European women. Yet another is suggested by James’ discov-
ery that “coital rates are much more closely related to duration of
marriage than to age.” By the time they were in their mid-thirties,
most Chinese women had been married twice as long as their Eu-
ropean counterparts.28
The critical claim in Lee and Wang’s argument—the plank
on which their whole argument rests—is that Chinese couples
limited their number of children by deliberately prolonging the
intervals between their births. The fact that birth intervals were as
long in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as in China militates
against the argument. But the Taiwan household registers provide
more direct, and thus more conclusive, evidence. They reveal
how many children a woman had borne by any age and how
many she bore after that age This information makes it possible to
evaluate Lee and Wang’s thesis by examining how a couple’s past
reproductive performance affected their future performance.
The received view of Chinese fertility is that most couples
made no effort to control their fertility because they wanted as
many sons as possible. It predicts that the more children a woman
has borne in the past, the more she will bear in the future because
her fertility history indexes her fecundity. Lee and Wang’s view is
that since most couples wanted only a limited number of sons,
they spaced their births to achieve but not overshoot this mark.
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28 James W. Wood, Dyanamic of Human Reproduction (New York, 1994), 405–407; William
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Their position predicts that any relationship between past and fu-
ture performance is bound to be negative. Couples who repro-
duced too rapidly when young would have made an effort to slow
down later, whereas those who reproduced too slowly when
young would have made an effort to speed up later.
To test these views, this study calculates fertility rates that take
account of how many children a woman has borne, her age at the
birth of her last child, and the number of years since the birth of
that child. These are duration-speciªc rates in which the duration
is the years elapsed since the birth of a given child (the index child
in Figure 1). These rates indicate whether past fertility inºuences
the future fertility of women who bear children at a designated
age. Figure 1 says that it does—but in the opposite direction of
what Lee and Wang predict. The columns in each of the ªve age
classes all point to the same conclusion: The more children
women have borne, the more they will bear in the future. With
the partial exception of women nearing the end of their reproduc-
tive lives, the columns in each cluster rise in step-like fashion from
the lower parities to the higher parities, in exactly the way that
the received view of Chinese fertility predicts. Because couples
wanted as many sons as possible, they made no concerted effort to
control their fertility. The result was a positive correlation be-
tween past and future performance because fertility was largely a
function of fecundability. Couples who were fecund performed
well at all ages; those who were not performed poorly at all ages.
Lee and Wang could reasonably argue that because of deliber-
ate spacing, low fertility below a certain age predicts low fertility
later. What their argument cannot accommodate is the evidence
showing that high fertility below a certain age predicts high fertil-
ity later. To limit their fertility by means of deliberate spacing, a
fecund couple had to begin spacing early in life. But if Chinese
couples were adept in this regard, why did so many of them pro-
duce seven or eight children by the time the wife was thirty? And
why, if Chinese couples wanted to limit their fertility, did these
same couples bear more children later than their less fertile peers?
Only toward the end of their reproductive lives did their fertility
fall slightly below that of couples with fewer children. This de-
crease could be evidence of birth control, but far from necessarily.
After having already borne eight or nine children, a wife might
have been exhausted or suffering from wear and tear. Or, after
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Fig. 1 Marital Fertility by Parity of Index Child and Mother’s Age at
Time of Birth
having completely fulªlled her duty as a daughter-in-law, she
might have been relieved of further child bearing. This could be
considered a form of birth control but is not the strenuous form
hypothesized by Lee and Wang and not a form that would have
made much difference.
Lee and Wang build their thesis on a comparison of China
and Western Europe, particularly China and England. At no point
in their book do they mention any of the other old states that, like
China, were characterized by early and universal marriage; conse-
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Fig. 1 (continued)
note The fertility rate shown herein is the average of the durations following the birth of
the index child. The duration-speciªc rates are given in Table A3. The woman-years for fer-
tility rates are given in Table A4.
quently, they never address the questions raised by placing China
in a larger context. Was Chinese fertility low compared to the hu-
man average? Was it so low as to make deliberate birth control the
only likely explanation? These demanding questions are answer-
able, thanks to Campbell and Wood, who, during the late 1980s,
searched the literature for reliable data describing populations
whose fertility qualiªed as “natural” by Henry’s deªnition. They
found such data for seventy societies and calculated a total fertility
rate for each of them. Figure 2 presents their results, together with
the total fertility rates of seventy societies showing “controlled”
fertility by Henry’s criterion. The mean total fertility rates are 6.1
for the natural-fertility populations and 2.6 for the controlled-
fertility populations.29
When placed in a global context, Chinese fertility was not
low by human standards. In fact, at about 6.0, it was right on the
mean for natural-fertility populations. This discovery does not
prove that the Chinese refrained from deliberate birth control, but
it adds greatly to the burden of proof that Lee and Wang must
bear. They must either generalize their thesis to include most his-
torical societies with early and nearly universal marriage, or they
must give reasons why birth control in China was necessary to
achieve a level of fertility produced by involuntary means in many
other societies.
The other societies at or near the norm for natural-fertility
populations include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Was deliberate birth control common in these societies? If not,
what kept fertility far below the recorded maximum? Bangladesh
is particularly instructive because it has been the subject of inten-
sive study, and its reproductive regime shares many of the same
characteristics as China’s. In both societies, marriage occurred at a
young age (between sixteen and eighteen years for women); the
median birth interval was long (thirty to thirty-four months); and
the average age at last birth was young, compared to that in Eu-
rope (thirty-eight to thirty-nine years).
Some evidence suggests that older Bengali couples practiced
coitus interruptus as a means of preventing or delaying additional
births, though none of it indicates that this technique was a major
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determinant of Bengali fertility. The major determinant was a
lengthy period of lactational amenorrhea—eighteen to twenty
months—and consequently a long inter-birth interval—thirty-
three to thirty-ªve months. Whether this interval was due primar-
ily to Bengali nursing practices or to some combination of nursing
practices and malnourishment is not clear. What is certain is that
the subtraction of eighteen to twenty months of lactational amen-
orrhea and nine months of gestation from the average birth inter-
val does not allow much time for birth control. An average of
seven or eight months is common for women who do not practice
birth control.30
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Fig. 2 Distribution of Total Fertility Rates in Natural-Fertility and
Controlled-Fertility Populations
source James W. Wood, Dynamics of Human Reproduction: Biology, Biometry, Demography
(New York, 1994), 48.
Estimates of the length of lactational amenorrhea in Late Im-
perial China do not exist, but Chinese and Bengali women are
known to have led similar lives. Like Bengali women, Chinese
women were poor, and, like Bengali women, they nursed their
children for two or more years. Hence, birth control is neither the
only nor the most likely explanation of their low marital fertility.
A more compelling explanation, given the known determinants of
fertility in similar societies, is a long period of lactational amenor-
rhea due to some combination of malnourishment and prolonged
breast feeding, as ªrst suggested by Barclay et al. to account for rel-
atively low estimates of Chinese fertility. After ruling out deliber-
ate birth control as a plausible explanation of the low marital-
fertility rate estimated from the Farm Survey, they wrote:
Lacking further details . . . , we can conjecture its causes on the ba-
sis of interesting parallels that are being discovered elsewhere.
Frisch suggested that prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately
nourished women may lower the fat content of their bodies suf-
ªciently to lengthen the period of postpartum amenorrhea. An
average eighteen-month period of postpartum amenorrhea (com-
pared with nine months in a Chilean population) is revealed in re-
cords of menstruation collected from a rural population in Camilla
district, Bangladesh. The Bangladesh women had average inter-
birth intervals indicating a level of marital fertility not much higher
than among the Chinese Farmers.31
Lee and Wang quote Barclay et al. when they note that “mar-
ital fertility as low as that in China would be expected by demog-
raphers only in populations in which some combination of contra-
ception and abortion is practiced.” They ignore them, however,
when they rule out birth control as an explanation and propose in-
stead “prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately nourished
women.”32
Lee and Wang’s challenge to the received view of China fails for
two reasons. The ªrst is the lack of evidence for widespread, de-
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tion and Fertility in Bangladesh: Breastfeeding and Post-Partum Amenorrhea,” ibid., XLI
(1987), 447–462; Noreen Goldman, Charles F. Westoff, and Lois E. Paul, “Variations in
Natural Fertility: The Effect of Lactation and Other Determinants,” ibid., XLI (1987), 127–
146.
31 Barclay at al., “Reassessment,” 625.
32 Lee and Wang, One Quarter of Humanity, 189 n. 10.
liberate birth control. Marital fertility was lower than in Europe
but not as low as Lee and Wang claim. Nor was it low enough to
make birth control the only plausible explanation, or even the
most likely explanation. The second reason is that contrary to Lee
and Wang’s central thesis, total fertility was much higher in China
than in Europe. Whereas most European fertility rates fell far be-
low the mean for natural-fertility societies, the Chinese rate stood
precisely at the mean. Late Imperial China remains more or less
where Malthus placed it. It did not enjoy the favorable demo-
graphic conditions found in the United States, and it did not have
the effective means of fertility control found in Britain. Lee and
Wang treat it as a special case, but it was, in fact, representative of
the great majority of old states with organic economies.
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
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